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The Effects of Official Action Taken 
Against Problem Driversl 
D. H. SCHUSTER" 
The purpose of this study was to evaluate the effectiveness of 
official departmental action taken against the driving license of 
problem drivers. 
A study by Schuster ( 1969) with California problem drivers 
turned up the interesting result that subsequent driving behavior 
of problem drivers who were barely in trouble with the law im-
proved if less action than normal was taken against them. Con-
versely, subsequent driving degradation was associated with more 
severe action than normal. However, extreme problem drivers or 
chronic violators who had extremely poor driving records for a 
number of years showed an opposite trend. If these extreme prob-
lem drivers had had more severe action taken against their license 
than normally indicated, this was associated with a more than 
average subsequent improwmcnt in their driving record. If these 
extreme problem drivers had less than the usual action taken, this 
was associated with less than average improvement. This California 
study showed that the effectiveness of punitive action against prob-
lem drivers was opposite to that intended for beginning problem 
drivers, whereas for extreme problem dri,·ers, the punitive action 
was positively corn·lated with improvement as intended by the 
punishment. 
A study by Wilkes ( 1967) showed the same trend for begin-
ning problem drivers in Iowa as California. Iowa problem drivers 
were interviewed and had action accorded to them. Subsequently 
their driving improvement was better if less than the usual action 
had been accorded the-m, and was worse if more than the usual 
punitive action had been accorded the-m. 
Unfortunately both studies were cm-relational or associative; 
that is, no state-ments whatsoeve-r about cause and effect can be 
made-. The question of which came first, the punitive action or 
driver's subsequent driving behavior, cannot be solved this way. 
Two possible interpretations exist. The driver improvement inter-
viewer may have been sufficiently perceptive and astute to note 
which drivers were going to improve and thus not have given them 
harsh punitive action. Or the interviewer may have perceived that 
the driver was not going to improve and thus have given more 
1 This was a cooperative study done in conjunction with the Iowa De-
partment of Public Safety; in particular, Sgt A. Chyrstal did the driver 
interviewing. A note of thanks goes to R. Mendel for his help in collecing 
follow-up data. 
2 Iowa State Uni,·ersity. 
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severe action than usual. Thus one interpretation is that the driver 
improvement interviewer simply perceived the problem driver as 
he really was and dealt him treatment with a certain amount of 
validity. The second explanation is that the punitive action taken 
at the time of the interview actually caused the subsequent driver 
behavior but in an adverse direction. That is, if the problem driver 
were accorded more severe action than usual, he may have told 
himself, "The department thinks I'm a problem driver; therefore 
I am," and he subsequently drove accordingly. If the department 
gave him less severe action than usual he may have told himself, 
"The department thinks I'm a good driver and therefore I am," 
and again he drove accordingly. 
Action taken officially against a driver's license needs discus-
sion here as an ordinal variable. The lowest level is that where 
the Department of Public Safety takes no official action. This is 
by far and away the action accorded the bulk of drivers in the 
state. When a driver has two moving violations for some negligent 
driving behavior on his part, the department sends him a warning 
letter as the first official action. In particular warning letters arc 
sent out when thP drivt>r has accumulated two moving violations 
within one year; depending upon the seriousness the department 
may place the driver on probation as the next lt>vel of action. The 
driver's performance is monitored and further increase in his mov-
ing violations or accidents makes him liable for more severe action. 
\\Then a driver has three or more moving violations and/or ac-
cidents in one year, he is liable for more severe action. This more 
severe official action usually takes the fonn of 30 days suspension 
of his driver's license. The driver during these 30 days is not sup-
posed to drive, although a few drivers do so. It should be noted 
that certain serious violations nonnally require suspension of 
license. For instance, a single drunk driving offense for the first 
time results in 60 days revocation of license. Nonnally however. 
more severe action against a driver's license simply becomes more 
days of suspension of driver's license such as 60, 90, 120, 180 and 
suspension for one year which is tantamount to revocation. Revoca-
tion of a driver's license typically occurs for such things as con-
tinued poor driving, such as drunk driving or leaving tht> scent> of 
accidents in which the driver had been involved. 
METHOD 
The research method used was a one-wav analysis of variance 
design wherein the action taken against a driver at the encl of an 
improvement interview was manipulated. At the end of a one-
hour improvement interview for a problem driver, the highway 
patrolman examiner made up his mind as to what action he would 
normally take with this particular problem driwr. Then the inter-
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viewer randomly manipulated the action as follows: 1-one step 
less than normal, 2-normal, or 3-one step more than the normal 
action already decided upon. To achieve the random selection, the 
interviewer picked one of three numbered pencils at random from 
his top desk drawer. The interviewer reached in the desk drawer 
blindly and selected one of the numbered pencils. If he picked the 
#3 pencil, the driver got one step more severe action than that 
already decided upon, if he got the #2 pencil, he got the action 
already decided upon (normal), if he got the # 1 pencil, the 
driver got one step less severe action than that already decided 
upon. 
Drivers thus were assigned randomly to one of three treatment 
groups depending upon whether they had one step more severe 
than normal action, normal action, or one step less severe action 
than normal for their particular case. It was to be expected accord-
ingly that the drivers should be comparable on other characteristics 
such as previous violations in the preceeding three years, previous 
accidents, prior action taken against their driver's license, age, sex 
ratio, and racial composition of the groups. It was also expected 
that there would be some minor variation in these prior characteris-
tics due to random fluctuations in the assignment of drivers to one 
of the three groups. In particular there was some concern about 
assigning drivers to the more severe treatment group, particularly 
where this resulted in going from probation to suspension of license 
for a period of 30 days. Originally there were 125 drivers in the 
less-than-normal action group, 114 in the normal action group, and 
98 in the more-than-normal action group. 
Compensating for these minor variations in matching char-
acteristics was done in two ways. First, cases were deleted appro-
priately from the normal and less than normal action groups such 
that the characteristics under concern were matched to those of 
the third group, more than normal action. After adjustment for 
these minor sampling biases, the three groups were comparable in 
previous driving record, age, sex ratio, and racial composition. 
These matching characteristics are shown in Table 1. None of the 
characteristics approached significance among the three groups at 
the 5% level. 
Table 1 also shows data on the 55 people excluded from the 
study because they objected to and appealed the decision of the 
interviewer or they brought a lawyer along with them. Either of 
these two reasons was felt to constitube a justifiable basis for ex-
cluding the driver from this study. The extent of this bias was in-
vestigated by including the characteristics of these 55 people ex-
cluded from this also in Table 1. 
The second method of compensating for variations in matching 
characteristics of the groups at the time of the interview was 
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Table 1. Matching characteristics of the manipulated action groups after 
adjustment ( n = 98 per group). 
Manipulated Action 
Averages of Excluded Less Normal More Probability 
(n=55) 
Age in years 31.53 25.68 26.82 24.20 NS 
Previous violations 4.53 3.95 4.24 4.46 .10 
Previous accidents 0.82 0.86 0.85 0.98 NS 
Previous action' 1.80 1.73 1.68 1.97 NS 
Interview action 1.67 2.67 3.29 .001 
Percentages of 
N on-caucasians 5'/o 3% 2% 2 '/o NS 
Female sex 15'/o 4% 12% 7% .10 
NS=Not Significant at the 10% level for the three manipulated groups. 
l=Action code: 0-None, 1- -warning letter (or short restriction), 2-
Probation, 3-Suspended, 5-30 days, 4- Suspended 45-180 days, 5--
Suspended over 180 days or license revoked. 
statistical in nature; an analysis of covariance was used which con-
trolled for differences among groups on age and previous driving 
record. 
Both methods of compensation were used; the results simply 
are different, but complementary, ways of looking at the same data. 
RESULTS 
Two types of analyses were made on the data. Analyses of 
covariance and simple analyses of variance on the matched groups 
were made on the 12 month follow-up data. 
The analyses of covariance used the four co-variables of age, 
previous violations, previous accidents, and previous action taken 
by the department in the three years just prior to the interview. 
The follow-up data in the 12 months following the interview for 
the matched groups are shown in Table 2. The five criteria or 
dependent \-ariahles were violations, accidents, responsible accident 
count, accident severity count and follow-up action taken by the 
department in the 12 months after the date of the interview. Data 
for these criteria were obtained from the state driver records in 
Des Moines and from filed reports of investigated accidents. None 
of these criteria was significantly different at the 5jlo level among 
the three groups. However, the F -ratios for moving violations and 
departmental action approached significance. It is seen that the 
group accorded more action at the interview had more follow-up 
moving violations and more subsequent departmental action than 
the other groups. The implication of this trend is that the more 
severe interview action "caused" more moving violations later on 
and also required more follow-up action on the part of the depart-
ment. 
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Table 2. Follow-up driving data one year later by manipulated action 
groups after matching ( n = 98 per group). 
Manipulated Action 
Follow-up 
Characteristic Less Normal More F Probability' 
-
Moving violations 0.74 0.66 1.00 1.91 .10 
Driving accidents 0.19 0.26 0.21 0.39 NS 
Responsible accident 
counts' 0.39 0.57 0.51 0.60 NS 
Accident severity 
counts' 0.36 0.42 0.39 0.10 NS 
Subsequent action 1.11 0.97 1.45 1.57 NS 
NS= Not Significant at the 10% level. 
1: Probability of F-ratio for simple analysis of variance on matched 
groups. 
2: Responsible accident count coding was, 0-No accident involvement, 
1-Not responsible for an accident involvement, 2-Partially res-
ponsible, and 3-Responsible for an accident. 
3: Accident severity count coding was, 0-No accident involvement or 
less than $100 damage, 1-$100 to $299 damage, 2- $300 to $999 
damage or injury, 3---$1000 damage and over or injury. 
The punitive action given to a problem driver at an interview 
was intended to make the driver improve his driving behavior. 
None of the criteria supports this contention. If anything, the 
insignificant trends discussed above support just the opposite. 
The twelve month later follow-up driving record of the three 
manipulated action groups was analyzed also with an analysis of 
covariance. The results of these analyses are shown in Table 3. 
This shows the average on each of the five criteria for the three 
manipulated action groups before matching on age and prior driv-
ing record. In the analysis of covariance the control variables were 
age and previous driving record of moving violations, accidents, 
and action taken by the department. Table 3 shows that none of 
the differences was significant at the five percent level for any of 
the five criteria between the groups. Thus, the manipulated action 
was ineffective in producing improvement either as desired by the 
departmental action or in line with the hypothesis of this study. 
There was a slight trend in line with the latter for moving viola-
tions. Certainly the results do not support the supposed effect of 
punitive action where the drivers should have had fewer violations 
for their more-than-normal action. 
Correlational analyses within each goup were also done to see 
if action at the time of the interview was correlated with subsequent 
driving record. The data in Table 4 show, in the Normal and 
More-than-Normal action groups, that interview action was posi-
tively correlated with subsequent moving violations and depatmen-
tal action. There were similar trends, but insignificant, in the Less-
5
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Characteristic Less Normal More F' p 
Moving violations 0.69 0.63 1.00 0.27 NS' 
Driving accidents 0.18 0.23 0.21 0.15 NS 
Responsible accident 
counts 0.40 0.52 0.51 0.14 NS 
Accident severity 
counts 0.31 0.39 0.39 0.04 NS 
Subsequent action 1.02 0.94 1.45 0.28 NS 
---- -- -··-·--
1: F-ratio in analysis of covariance with co-variables of age, previous 
violations, previous accidents and previous action. 
2: Not Significant at the 5% level. 
Table 4. Correlation coefficients between amount of interview action and 
subsequent driving record by manipulated action group. 
Manipulation Group' 
Follow-up Characteristic Less Normal More 
Moving violations .17 .21 * .22* 
Driving accidents .00 .23* -.04 
Accident responsibility count .04 .20* -~.03 
Accident severity count -.01 .17 -.04 
Subsequent action .08 .24* . 28** 
1: Number of cases per group were, Less: 125, Normal: 114 and More. 98. 
* Significant at the 5% level. **Significant at the 1 % level. 
than-Normal action group. These findings also repeat those of the 
previous studies, Wilkes ( 1967) and Schuster ( 1969). 
CONCLUSIONS 
Reconciling the analyses of variance results with the correla-
tional results is something of a problem. The first type of analysis 
lead to the conclusion that manipulating punitive action at the 
time of interviewing a problem driver had no effect in a causal 
sense upon his later driving behavior. The second type of analysis 
indicated that, within each group of drivers with manipulated ac-
tion, there yet existed the previously reported positive correlation 
between interview action and subsequent driving record of moving 
violation and departmental action afterward. Since the hypothesis 
of a causal relationship between interview action and subsequent 
driving has been rejected, perhaus the alternative hypothesis ad-
vanced should be scrutinized. This hypothesis was that the inter-
viewing patrolmen were astute judges of drivers and meted out 
appropriate action at the end of the interview. The correlational 
.. 
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data in Table 4 suppot this hypothesis but cannot prove it since 
such data can only show association and not causation. And of 
course, yet a third phyothesis, so far unknown, could account for 
these results. The answer lies in more research. 
References 
SCHUSTER, D. H., 1969. ]. Safety Res. 1(2): 80-87. 
WILKES, R. L. Prediction of follow-up driver record. Unpublished Master's 
thesis, Iowa State University, 1967 . 
7
Schuster: The Effects of Official Action Taken Against Problem Drivers
Published by UNI ScholarWorks, 1970
